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Outline Part I
• Most of today’s lecture is based on
Abowd, John M. and Ian Schmutte “Economic 
Analysis and Statistical Disclosure Limitation” 
Brookings Papers on Economics Activity (Spring 
2015): 221-293. Includes discussion. [free 
download] (Brookings does not use DOIs.) 
Online appendix is in the same place.
Curated URL (Labor Dynamics Institute, Cornell)
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First, a Live Demo!
• The demo will only be live at Cornell and Census. Other 
sites have too few enrollees for the exercise to work 
properly
• The local instructor is now distributing a sealed envelope to 
each person in the class
CHOOSE YOUR OWN ENVELOPE
DO NOT LET THE INSTRUCTOR CHOOSE
DO NOT OPEN THE 
ENVELOPE!!!!!!!!!!
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Now, Let’s Analyze the Data
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The Basic Economics
• Scientific data quality is a pure public good
• Quantifiable privacy protection is also a pure 
public good  (bad, when measured as “loss”) 
when supplied using the methods I will discuss 
shortly
• Computer scientists have succeeded in providing 
feasible technology sets relating the public goods: 
data quality and privacy protection
• These technology sets generate a quantifiable 
production possibilities frontier between data 
quality and privacy protection
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The Basic Economics II
• We can now estimate the marginal social cost of data 
quality as a function of privacy protection—a big step 
forward
• The CS models are silent (or, occasionally, just wrong) 
about how to choose a socially optimal location on the 
PPF because they ignore social preferences
• To solve the social choice problem, we need to 
understand how to quantify preferences for data 
quality v. privacy protection
• For this we use the Marginal Social Cost of data quality 
and the Marginal Social Benefit of data quality, both 
measured in terms of the required privacy loss
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Now, Back to the Live Example
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Four Principles of Ideal Data Publication -
Privacy Protection Systems
• To the maximum extent possible, scientific 
analysis should be performed on the original 
confidential data
• Publication of statistical results should respect a 
quantifiable privacy-loss budget constraint
• Data publication algorithms should provably 
compose
• Data publication algorithms should be provably 
robust to arbitrary ancillary information
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Outline
• Why must users of restricted-access data learn 
about confidentiality protection?
• What is statistical disclosure limitation?
• What are formal privacy methods?
• Examples of SDL and formal privacy methods
– Traditional SDL
– Differential Privacy
– The Inferential Disclosure Link
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Why Are We Covering This?
• The vast majority of data users have no 
exposure to the SDL techniques applied to the 
data they use
• The tradition in SDL is to protect the details of 
what was done as part of the protocol
– Here’s the complete description for the American 
Community Survey public-use micro sample: 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data_documen
tation/pums_confidentiality/
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Explosion of Research in 
Computer Science
• Differential privacy, developed by Cynthia Dwork 
and many collaborators fundamentally changed 
the nature of the discussion
• Generalizations of Dwork’s approach are called 
“formal privacy” models
• The standards of modern cryptography apply:
– An algorithm only provides protection if it can survive 
an attack by anyone armed with all the details of the 
protection algorithm except the actual random 
numbers, if any, used in the protection
• This is where the four principles above originate
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Restricted-access Data Users
• Must normally subject their analyses to 
statistical disclosure limitation, including 
limitation by differential privacy methods
• It is extremely important to understand what 
this means for the quality of the released 
research and its replicability
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Statistical Disclosure Limitation
• Protection of the confidentiality of the underlying micro-data
– Avoiding identity disclosure
– Avoiding attribute disclosure
– Avoiding inferential disclosure
• Identity disclosure: who (or what entity) is in the confidential 
micro-data
• Attribute disclosure: value of a characteristic for that entity or 
individual
• Inferential disclosure: improvement of the posterior odds of a 
particular event (identity or attribute)
• Reference: Duncan, George T., Mark Elliot, and Juan-José Salazar-González (2011) 
Statistical Confidentiality: Principles and Practice, New York: Springer.
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Privacy-preserving Datamining and 
Differential Privacy
• Formally define the properties of “privacy”
• Introduce algorithmic uncertainty as part of the statistical 
process
• Prove that the algorithmic uncertainty meets the formal 
definition of privacy
• Differential privacy defines protection in terms of making 
the released information about an entity as close as 
possible to being independent of whether or not that 
entity’s data are included in the tabulation data file
• Reference: Dwork, Cynthia, and Aaron Roth (2014) “The 
Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy,” 
Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science 9, 
nos. 3–4: 211–407. [free download]
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Point of Commonality: 
Inferential disclosure
• Confidential data item Y={0,1}
• Published data item Z={0,1}
• Prior odds: Pr[Y=1]/Pr[Y=0]
• Posterior odds: Pr[Y=1|Z=z]/Pr[Y=0|Z=z]
• Inferential disclosure if
𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 1|𝑍 = 𝑧
𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 0|𝑍 = 𝑧
𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 1
𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 0
> 𝑒𝜀
• Where exp(e) is a predetermined limit
• Reference: Duncan, George T., and Diane Lambert (1986) “Disclosure-
Limited Data Dissemination,” Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 81, no. 393: 10–18.
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Point of Commonality: 
Inferential disclosure
• Consider two confidential datasets Y and Y*
• Z and Z* are neighbors if sup|Y-Y*| 1 (think: differs in 
the value in one row)
• Randomized publication algorithm: M(Y) publishes Z
• Publication is e–differentially private if and only if
𝑠𝑢𝑝 𝑌,𝑌∗𝑖
𝑃𝑟 𝑍 = 𝑀 𝑌 = 𝑖|𝑌 = 𝑖
𝑃𝑟 𝑍 = 𝑀 𝑌∗ = 𝑖|𝑌∗ = 𝑖
< 𝑒𝜀
for all sup|Y-Y*| 1 (neighbors) and i=0,1.
• Reference: Dwork, C. (2006) “Differential privacy,” 
Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Automata, 
Languages and Programming (ICALP), pp. 1–12.
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The Impossibility Theorm
• e-differential privacy implies a bound on the maximal inferential 
disclosure from a publication Z based on confidential data Y
for all sup|Y-Y*| 1 (neighbors) and i=0,1
• implies
where the supremum is taken over the rows of Y and Z.
• Therefore, there can be no informative data publication without some 
inferential disclosure
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𝑠𝑢𝑝
𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 1|𝑍 = 𝑧
𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 0|𝑍 = 𝑧
𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 1
𝑃𝑟 𝑌 = 0
< 𝑒𝜀
𝑠𝑢𝑝 𝑌,𝑌∗ ,𝑖
𝑃𝑟 𝑍 = 𝑀 𝑌 = 𝑖|𝑌 = 𝑖
𝑃𝑟 𝑍 = 𝑀 𝑌∗ = 𝑖|𝑌∗ = 𝑖
< 𝑒𝜀
Discussion
• Many of the details have been left out
• Notice that when e=0, the posterior odds are 
equal to the prior odds, and the publication 
contains nothing informative
• This concept is called semantic security in the 
cryptography literature
• Reference: Goldwasser, S. and Micali, S. (1982) “Probabilistic encryption & 
how to play mental poker keeping secret all partial information,” 
Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of 
computing, ACM, pp. 365–377.
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Now, Back to the Live Example
April 25, 2016
© John M. Abowd and Lars Vilhuber 2016, 
all rights reserved
19
General Methods for Statistical 
Disclosure Limitation
• At the Census Bureau SDL is called Disclosure 
Avoidance Review 
• Traditional methods
– Suppression
– Coarsening
– Adding noise via swapping
– Adding noise via sampling
• Newer methods
– Explicit noise infusion
– Synthetic data
– Formal privacy-preserving sanitizers
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Suppression
• This is by far the most common technique
• Model the sensitivity of a particular data item 
or observation (“disclosure risk”)
• Do not allow the release of data items that 
have excessive disclosure risk (primary 
suppression)
• Do not allow the release of other data from 
which the sensitive item can be calculated 
(complementary suppression)
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Suppression in Model-base Releases
• Most data analysis done in the RDCs is model-
based
• The released data consist of summary 
statistics, model coefficients, standard errors, 
some diagnostic statistics
• The SDL technique used for these releases is 
usually suppression: the suppression rules are 
contained (up to confidential parameters) in 
the RDC Researcher’s Handbook
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Coarsening
• Coarsening is the creation of a smaller number of 
categories from the variable in order to increase the 
number of cases in each cell
• Computer scientists call this “generalizing”
• Geographic coarsening: block-block group-tract-minor civil 
division-county-state-region
• Top coding of income is a form of coarsening
• All continuous variables in a micro-data file can be 
considered coarsened to the level of precision (significant 
digits) released
• This method is often applied to model-based data releases 
by restricting the number of significant digits that can be 
released
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Swapping
• Estimate the disclosure risk of certain attributes 
or individuals
• If the risk is too great, attributes of one data 
record are (randomly) swapped with the same 
attributes of another record
• If geographic attributes are swapped this has the 
effect of placing the risky attributes in a different 
location from the truth
• Commonly used in household censuses and 
surveys
• Rarely used with establishment data
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Sampling
• Sampling is the original SDL technique
• By only selecting certain entities from the 
population on which to collect additional data 
(data not on the frame), uncertainty about 
which entity was sampled provides some 
protection
• In modern, detailed surveys, sampling is of 
limited use for SDL
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Rules and Methods for 
Model-based SDL
• Refer to Chapter 3 of the RDC Researcher’s 
Handbook
• Suppress: coefficients on detailed indicator 
variables, on cells with too few entities
• Smooth: density estimation and quantiles, use a 
kernel density estimator to produce quantiles
• Coarsen: variables with heavy tails (earnings, 
payroll), residuals (truncate range, suppress 
labels of range)
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PROPERTIES OF STATISTICAL 
DISCLOSURE LIMITATION METHODS
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Statistical disclosure limitation is 
ignorable if and only if the analysis 
designed for the confidential data yields 
the same result when applied to the 
published data.
SDL is almost never ignorable.
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Nonignorable statistical disclosure 
limitation is known if and only if the 
analysis of the published data can be 
exactly corrected for the data alterations 
introduced by the SDL.
Nonignorable SDL is known for a limited 
number of methods.
April 25, 2016
© John M. Abowd and Lars Vilhuber 2016, 
all rights reserved
29
Nonignorable statistical disclosure 
limitation is discoverable if and only if 
the analysis of the published data can be 
probabilistically corrected for the data 
alterations introduced by the SDL.
Nonignorable SDL is discoverable for 
many methods.
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In modern SDL, the relevant trade-off
for economists is between methods that 
are easy to make SDL aware (generalized 
randomized response when certain 
parameters are public) and those that 
are not (suppression and swapping as 
currently implemented).
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• Oldest SDL technique (Warner 1965; predates 
formal SDL itself)
• Hide the question asked from the interviewer
• Respondent’s answer “yes” applies to either the 
sensitive question or a non-sensitive question
• Two SDL parameters: probability asked sensitive 
question, probability “yes” for non-sensitive 
question
• SDL affects the mean and standard error for 
parameter of interest: proportion of population 
“yes” for sensitive question
Example 1: Randomized Response
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• “Yes”: Probability asked sensitive question ½
• Probability “yes” for innocuous question ½
• Ever xxxx: 
• Inferential disclosure (Bayes factor):
• e-differential privacy (maximum ln Bayes factor): 
ln () = 
• SDL nonignorable and known
Example 1: Randomized Response 
(continued)
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Now, Back to the Live Example
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• Published income topcoded at T
• Quantiles of published income = quantiles of 
confidential income for all quantiles less than the 
quantile of T
• SDL is ignorable for quantiles less than the 
quantile of T
• SDL is nonignorable but discoverable for 
quantiles at or above the quantile of T (discovery 
is via inspection of the data combined with the 
knowledge that SDL topcoding was applied)
Example 2: Topcoding
April 25, 2016
© John M. Abowd and Lars Vilhuber 2016, 
all rights reserved
35
• Published data are a large contingency table with  
confidential data available for every cell
• Oldest formal SDL technique (Fellegi 1972)
• Most common SDL method in use worldwide
• Some values are suppressed because either the data 
in the cell were deemed “sensitive” or a 
complementary suppression was needed to protect 
another sensitive cell
• The missing data items are not ignorable; therefore 
the SDL is nonignorable
• Suppression is almost always discoverable
Example 3: Tabular Suppression
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Example 4: Regression Discontinuity 
and Regression Kink
• Running variable subjected to SDL from the 
generalized randomized response class (noise 
infusion, suppress and impute, synthetic data)
• SDL is nonignorable because the estimated 
treatment effect is confounded by the probability 
that SDL was applied to the running variable
• SDL is known if the agency publishes that 
probability
• SDL is discoverable if the agency publishes the 
fact that a generalized randomized response 
method was used
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Example 4: Regression Discontinuity 
and Regression Kink (continued)
• In RD and RK designs where the probability of SDL is 
known, divide the treatment effect and its standard 
error by the probability
• In designs where the SDL is discoverable use the 
“compliance” function implied by generalized 
randomized response to estimate the treatment effect 
using the appropriate fuzzy RD/RK estimator; 
adjustment of standard error is part of the fuzzy RD/RK 
method
• All other RD/RK assumptions are identical to those 
made in the confidential data analysis
• Analysis similar to Lee and Card (2008)
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• Same data structure as in tabular suppression: 
published data are a large contingency table with  
confidential data available for every cell
• Instead of suppression, all items are published by 
tabulating input data that have been infused 
with noise (every input value modified)
• SDL is nonignorable
Example 5: Tabular Noise Infusion
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• SDL is known if the agency publishes the statistical 
properties of the noise process—usually, i.i.d. with 
zero mean and constant known variance
• SDL is discoverable if there is another tabular 
summary with the same expected value but 
published using a different SDL method or different 
noise infusion parameters
• Example: Quarterly Workforce Indicators, Quarterly 
Census of Employment and Wages, County Business 
Patterns
Example 5: Tabular Noise Infusion 
(continued)
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• All of the following can be modeled as generalized 
random response:
– Swapping
– Input noise infusion (adding random values)
– Suppress and impute (replacing some values with 
imputations; also called partial synthetic data)
– Synthetic data (replacing some or all values with samples 
from the posterior distribution)
– Case considered by Alexander, Davern and Stevenson
(2010)
• SDL is never ignorable
• SDL is discoverable 
Example 6: Microdata Noise Infusion
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• Regression analysis when the dependent variable 
has been subject to “suppress and impute” SDL
• No other SDL
• SDL is nonignorable
• SDl is discoverable if the agency publishes the 
suppression rate, the list of variables used in the 
imputation models, and uses the complete 
confidential data matrix (including observations 
with suppressions) for imputation
• Analysis similar to Bollinger and Hirsch (2006)
Example 6: Microdata Noise Infusion 
(continued)
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• Fully synthetic data (all values replaced with samples 
from their posterior predictive distributions)
• Models fit on synthetic data validated by the agency 
on the actual confidential data
• Custom tabulation SDL applied to output from the 
confidential data (usually some suppression of 
coefficients)
• SDL is nonignorable
• Synthetic data systems published with fully SDL-
aware analysis tools
Example 7: Synthetic Data with 
Validation
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Synthetic Data and Program Evaluation
• Fully synthetic data cannot identify RD/RK effects (program 
treatment effects)
• Do permit full development of the specification (semi-
parametric estimation of the response and compliance 
functions)
• Certify design on synthetic data
• Validate certified design on the confidential data
• Prevents ex post adjustment of the evaluation (as in current 
best practices for clinical trials)
• Allows agency to fully restrict access to the confidential data 
without limiting evaluation options
• Publishes the intended evaluation
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• Variable y3 has been subjected to formal privacy 
protection and is published as z3.
The RD Evaluation Setup
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Details of Evaluation with Synthetic 
Data
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From Bertrand et al.
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Timeline: SDS application November 2012, gold standard results January 2013.
Bertrand, Marianne, Emir Kamenica and Jessica Pan (QJE 2015) “Gender 
identity and relative income within households.”
